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Equilibrium in insurance markets with adverse
selection when insurers pay policy dividends
Pierre Picard
July 1st, 2016
Abstract
We show that an equilibrium always exists in the Rothschild-Stiglitz insur-
ance market model with adverse selection and an arbitrary number of risk types,
when insurance contracts include policy dividend rules. The Miyazaki-Wilson-
Spence state-contingent allocation is an equilibrium allocation (dened as a set
of type-dependent lotteries sustained at a symmetric equilibrium of a market
game), and it is the only one when out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy a robust-
ness criterion. It is shown that stock insurers and mutuals may coexist, with
stock insurers o¤ering insurance coverage at actuarial price and mutuals cross-
subsidizing risks.
Ecole Polytechnique; email: pierre.picard@polytechnique.edu
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1 Introduction
The fact that no equilibrium may exist in the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) model of insur-
ance markets under adverse selection has been at the origin of an abundant literature
in economic theory. In one way or another, most articles in this area have moved
away from the basic premise of the Rothschild-Stiglitz approach. This approach con-
sisted of modelling the strategic interactions between insurers who simultaneously o¤er
contracts under hidden information about the risk types of insurance seekers.
An important avenue of research that followed the seminal contribution of Roth-
schild and Stiglitz (1976) has its origin in the article by Wilson (1977). It focuses
attention on competitive mechanisms when insurers interact in a dynamic way. This
includes the "anticipatory equilibrium" of Miyazaki (1977), Wilson (1977) and Spence
(1978), the "reactive equilibrium" of Riley (1979), and the variations on the equilib-
rium concept introduced by Hellwig (1987) and Engers and Fernandez (1987), and in
more recent papers surveyed by Mimra and Wambach (2014), in particular Mimra and
Wambach (2011), and Netzer and Scheuer (2014). Another line of research, illustrated
by the works of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006) among
others, departs from the strategic dimension and considers atomistic insurance markets
under adverse selection in line with the approach by Prescott and Townsend (1984).
Unlike these two strands of research,1 our purpose is to reexamine the equilibrium issue
1The fact that there may be no equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model is related to the
discontinuity of insurerspayo¤ functions, since small changes in their contract o¤ers may lead all
individuals of a given type to switch to other insurers, with a possible jump in the insurersexpected
prots. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986a,b) have established existence theorems for mixed strategy
equilibria in a class of games where payo¤ functions have discontinuity points, and, as shown by
Rosenthal and Weiss (1984) in the case of the Spence model of education choices, such a mixed
strategy equilibrium exists in the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance market model. However, assuming
that rms play mixed strategies at the contract o¤er stage has not been considered as reasonable
in the subsequent literature on markets with adverse selection. In addition, as shown by Rosenthal
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in a perspective that remains framed within the initial Rothschild-Stiglitz approach.
This requires a few preliminary explanations.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) considered a simple setting in which each insurer is
constrained to o¤ering a single contract, with a free entry equilibrium concept, but
they emphasized that such an equilibrium could be viewed as a Nash equilibrium of
a game in which insurers interact by o¤ering contracts simultaneously. They also
noted that a next step was to test a less restrictive denition of insurersstrategies.
In particular, they observed that allowing insurers to o¤er menus of contracts would
make the condition under which an equilibrium exists even more restrictive. When
commenting on the approach byWilson (1977), they noted that "the peculiar provision
of many insurance contracts, that the e¤ective premium is not determined until the
end of the period (when the individual obtains what is called a dividend), is perhaps
a reection of the uncertainty associated with who will purchase the policy, which in
turn is associated with the uncertainty about what contracts other insurance rms will
o¤er". In other words, many insurance contracts, mostly those o¤ered by mutuals, have
a participating dimension which should not be ignored when we seek to understand
how competition works in the real word.2
Our objective in the present paper is to move forward in that direction. In a rst
approach (Picard, 2014), we have studied how allowing insurers to o¤er either partic-
ipating or non-participating contracts, or in other words to act as mutuals or as stock
insurers,3 a¤ects the conclusion about the existence of an equilibrium if all other as-
and Weiss (1984), at a mixed-strategy equilibrium, a potential entrant could make positive prot.
This reinforces the fundamental conclusion of Rothschild and Stiglitz, that is, that an entry-deterring
equilibrium may not exist.
2Mutuals di¤er according to the role of the premium charged at the start of each policy period.
Advance premium mutuals set premium rates at a level that is expected to be su¢ cient to pay the
expected losses and expenses while providing a margin for contingencies, and policyholders usually
receive dividends. In contrast, assessment mutuals collect an initial premium that is su¢ cient only
to pay typical losses and expenses and levy supplementary premiums whenever unusual losses occur.
3This mapping between the nature of contracts (participating or non-participating) and the cor-
3
sumptions of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model are unchanged. An equilibrium (within the
meaning of Rothschild and Stiglitz) always exists in such a setting, and the socalled
Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence (MWS) allocation is a state contingent equilibrium alloca-
tion. Furthermore, mutuals o¤ering participating contracts is the corporate form that
emerges in markets where cross-subsidization provides a Pareto-improvement over the
Rothschild-Stiglitz separating pair of contracts, a case where no equilibrium exists in
the standard Rothschild-Stiglitz model. However, these conclusions were reached un-
der quite restrictive assumptions: we postulated that there were only two risk types
(high risk and low risk), as in the initial Rothschild-Stiglitz model, and we restricted
attention to linear policy dividend rules that allow insurers to distribute a xed pro-
portion of their aggregate underwriting prot to policyholders. Furthermore, we did
not present conditions under which a unique equilibrium allocation exists. The objec-
tive of the present paper is to reexamine these issues in a setting with an arbitrary
number of risk types and a more general denition of admissible policy dividend rules,
and also to obtain conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium allocation.
It turns out that, beyond the extended validity of our conclusions, considering an
arbitrary number of risk types provide an endogenous structure of corporate forms in
the insurance industry: mutuals emerge for risk type subgroups that require cross-
subsidization, while stock insurers and mutuals may provide coverage to subgroups
without cross-subsidization. We will thus explain why the coexistence of mutuals and
stock insurers is a natural outcome of competitive interactions in insurance markets,
porate form (mutuals or stocks) is of course an oversimplication of the insurance market. Firstly,
insurers may o¤er participating and non-participating contracts simultaneously. In particular, most
life insurance contracts include prot participation clauses, even in the case of stock insurers. Further-
more, whatever the corporate structure, the participation of policyholders in prot may take other
forms than policy dividends: in particular, it may be in the form of discounts when contracts are
renewed, which is a strategy available to stock insurers and mutuals. In addition, the superiority of
one corporate form over another may also reect other factors, including agency costs and governance
problems.
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a conclusion that ts with the facts observed in many countries.4 Finally, we will
also examine the issue of equilibrium uniqueness, and we will highlight a robustness
criterion under which there is a unique equilibrium. However, considering an arbitrary
number of types and non-linear policy dividend rules and extending the approach to
conditions under which a unique equilibrium exists requires a more formal approach
than the geometry-based reasoning that is su¢ cient for more simple cases, such as the
seminal article of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our setting,
which is an insurance market under adverse selection with an arbitrary number of
risk types, where insurance contracts may include policy dividend rules. Section 3 is
the core of the paper: it analyzes the market equilibrium by dening a market game
and an equilibrium of this game, as well as the MWS allocation in the manner of
Spence (1978). We show that this allocation is sustained by a symmetric equilibrium
of the market game and, more specically, that it may be sustained by participating
contracts for subgroups with cross-subsidization and non-participating contracts in
the other cases. Finally, we show that the MWS allocation is the only equilibrium
allocation under a robustness criterion derived from evolutionary stability criterions in
games with a continuum of players. Section 4 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The setting
We consider a large population represented by a continuum of individuals, with mass
1, facing idiosyncratic risks of having an accident.5 All individuals are risk averse:
4The mutual market share is over 40% in Japan, France and Germany. It is almost 50% in the
Netherlands and it is over 60% in Austria. In the US, it reached 36.3% in 2013. These aggregate
gures mask important disparities between the life and non-life lines of business.
5The word "accident" is taken in its generic meaning: it refers to any kind of insurable loss, such
as health care expenditures or re damages.
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they maximize the expected utility of wealth u(W ); where W denotes wealth and the
(twice continuously di¤erentiable) utility function u is such that u0 > 0 and u00 < 0:
If no insurance policy is taken out, we have W = WN in the no-accident state and
W = WA in the accident state; A = WN  WA is the loss from an accident. Individuals
di¤er according to their probability of accident , and they have private information
on their own accident probability. There are n types of individuals, with  = i for
type i with 0 < n < n 1 < ::: < 1 < 1. Hence, the larger the index i, the lower
the probability of an accident. i is the fraction of type i individuals among the whole
population with
Pn
i=1 i = 1.
Insurance contracts are o¤ered by m insurers (m  2) indexed by j = 1; :::;m who
may o¤er participating or non-participating contracts. In other words, insurers are
entrepreneurs who may be stock insurers or mutual insurers. Stock insurers pool risks
between policyholders through non-participating insurance contracts, and they transfer
underwriting prot to risk-neutral shareholders. Mutual insurers have no shareholders:
they share risks between their members only through participating contracts. Insurers
o¤er contracts in order to maximize their residual expected prot (i.e. the expected
corporate earnings after policy dividends have been distributed).6
We assume that each individual can take out only one contract. An insurance
contract is written as (k; x), where k is the insurance premium and x is the net payout
6Thus, the insurance corporate form is a consequence of the kind of insurance contracts o¤ered at
the equilibrium of the insurance market. It is not given ex ante. The underwriting activity as well as
all other aspects of the insurance business (e.g. claims handling) are supposed to be costless. Insurers
earn xed fees in a competitive market. The mere fact that they may transfer risks to risk-neutral
investors leads them to maximize the expected residual prot. If an insurer could increase its residual
expected prot by o¤ering other insurance policies, then it could contract with risk neutral investors
and secure higher xed fees. Note that the residual prot of a mutual is zero if prots are distributed
as policy dividends or losses are absorbed through supplementary premiums. In that case, if the
mutual insurer could make positive residual prot, then he would benet from becoming a stock
insurer.
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in case of an accident. Hence, x+k is the indemnity. Participating insurance contracts
also specify how policy dividends are paid or supplementary premiums are levied. We
will restrict attention to deterministic policies in which dividend rules dene the (non-
random) policy dividend D as a function of average prots and of the number of
policyholders, for each contract o¤ered by the insurer (see below for details).7 The
expected utility of a type i policyholder is then written as:
Eu = (1  i)u(WN   k +D) + iu(WA + x+D):
Our objective is to characterize a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a two
stage game called "the market game", where insurers can o¤er participating or non-
participating contracts. At stage 1, insurers o¤er menus of contracts, and at stage 2
individuals respond by choosing the contracts they prefer among the o¤ers made by
the insurers.
It is of utmost importance to note that the choices of individuals depend on the
intrinsic characteristics of the contracts that have been o¤ered at stage 1, but also on
expected policy dividends. Expected policy dividends should coincide with true divi-
dends (for contracts that are actually chosen by some individuals), that are themselves
dependent on the distribution of risk types among policyholders for each contract.
Thus, at stage 2, the participating nature of contracts induces a form of interdepen-
dence between individualsstrategies that is absent in the standard model with only
non-participating contracts.
At stage 1, the strategy of insurer j is dened by a menu of n contracts, one for
each type of individual, written as Cj = (Cj1 ; C
j
2 ; :::; C
j
n; D
j(:)), where Cjh = (k
j
h; x
j
h)
species the premium kjh and the net indemnity x
j
h. D
j(:) is a policy dividend rule, i.e.,
a way to distribute the net prots made on Cj. We write Dj(:) = (Dj1(:); :::; D
j
n(:)),
7D will be non random because the law of large numbers allows us to evaluate the average prot
by the expected prot made on a policyholder who is randomly drawn among the customers. D < 0
corresponds to a supplementary call.
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where Djh(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n) denotes the policy dividend paid to each individual who
has chosen contract Cjh when N
j
i is the fraction of individuals in the whole population
who have chosen Cji with underwriting prot (the di¤erence between premium and
indemnity) per policyholder P ji , with
Pm
j=1
Pn
i=1N
j
i = 1.
8 Cj is non-participating if
Djh(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n)  0 for all h, and otherwise it is said to be participating. In
particular, Cj is fully participating if underwriting prots are entirely distributed as
policy dividends, that is, if9
nX
h=1
N jhD
j
h(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n) 
nX
h=1
N jhP
j
h :
We will assume that Djh(N
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n; P
j
n) is non-decreasing with respect to P
j
1 ; :::; P
j
n
and homogeneous of degree zero with respect to (N j1 ; :::; N
j
n). We can write the policy
dividend as
Djh = D
j
h(
j
1; P
j
1 ; :::; 
j
n; P
j
n);
where
jh 
N jhPn
i=1N
j
i
is the fraction of insurer j0s customers who have chosen Cjh , with
Pn
h=1 
j
h = 1.
The homogeneity assumption is made for the sake of mathematical simplicity, but
also because it ts with the standard policy dividend rules we may think of. For
instance, if insurer j shares a fraction j 2 [0; 1] of its underwriting prot evenly
among all its policyholders, then we have
Djh = 
j
nX
i=1
jiP
j
i for all h = 1; :::; n:
If insurer j distributes a fraction j 2 [0; 1] of the underwriting prot made on Cjh to
the policyholders who have chosen this contract, then
Djh = 
jP jh for all h = 1; :::; n:
8Djh < 0 corresponds to a supplementary premium levied on C
j
h.
9Cj may be fully participating with Djh  0 for some h. In other words, a fully participating menu
may include non-participating policies.
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If insurer j distributes a fraction j 2 [0; 1] of its underwriting prot to the policyhold-
ers, with di¤erent rights to dividend according to the contract, then we may postulate
that there exist coe¢ cients jh  0, with j1 = 1 such that Djh = jhDj1, which gives
Djh =
jh
nX
h=1
ji
j
i
j
nX
h=1
jhP
j
h for all h = 1; :::; n:
Thus, although the homogeneity assumption reduces the generality of our analysis, it
nevertheless encompasses a broad variety of cases that we observe in practice.
3 Market equilibrium
Let C  (C1; C2; :::; Cm) be the prole of contract menus o¤ered by insurers at stage
1 of the market game, with Cj = (Cj1 ; C
j
2 ; :::; C
j
n; D
j(:)). At stage 2, the strategy of a
type i individual10 species for all j and all h the probability jih(C) to choose C
j
h as
a function of C. The contract choice strategy of type i individuals is thus dened by
i(C)  fjih(C) 2 [0; 1] for j = 1; :::;m and h = 1; :::; n with
Pm
j=1
Pn
h=1 
j
ih(C) = 1g
for all C. Let (:)  (1(:); 2(:); :::; n(:)) be a prole of individualsstrategies.
When an insurance contract Cjh = (k
j
h; x
j
h) is taken out by a type i individual, with
(non-random) policy dividend Djh, the policyholders expected utility and the expected
underwriting prot are respectively written as:
Ui(C
j
h; D
j
h)  (1  i)u(WN   kjh +Djh) + iu(WA + xjh +Djh);
i(C
j
h)  (1  i)kjh   ixjh:
10Hence, for the sake of notational simplicity, it is assumed that all individuals of the same type
choose the same mixed strategy. In a more general setting, di¤erent individuals of the same type
could choose di¤erent mixed strategies. This extension would not a¤ect our conclusions insofar as the
policy dividends paid by an insurer only depend on the distribution of customers among its contracts
and by the proportion of each type for each contract, and not on the identity of the individuals who
purchase a given contract. See the proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix.
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When type i individuals choose Cjh with probability 
j
ih, we may write 
j
h and P
j
h as
functions of individual choices and contracts:
jh() 
nX
i=1
i
j
ih
nX
i=1
nX
k=1
i
j
ik
if
nX
i=1
nX
k=1
i
j
ik > 0;
P jh(C
j
h; ) =
nX
i=1
i
j
ihi(C
j
h)
nX
i=1
i
j
ih
if
nX
i=1
i
j
ih > 0;
where  = (1; :::; n) with i = (:::; 
j
ih; :::).
We are now in a position to dene a market equilibrium more formally.
3.1 Denition of a market equilibrium
Denition 1 A prole of strategies e(:); eC  ( eC1; :::; eCm), where eCj = ( eCj1 ; :::; eCjn; eDj(:));
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the market game (in short a market equilib-
rium) if
mX
j=1
nX
h=1
ejih(C)Ui(Cjh; Djh(C)) = maxfUi(Cjh; Djh(C)); j = 1; :::;m; h = 1; :::; ng
for all i = 1; :::; n and all C; (1)

j
( eC)  j(Cj; eC j) for all Cj and all j = 1; :::;m (2)
where C  (C1; :::; Cm); Cj = (Cj1 ; :::; Cjn; Dj(:)); eC j = ( eC1; :::; eCj 1; eCj+1; :::; eCm)
and
D
j
h(C)  Djh(
j
1(C); P
j
1(C); :::; 
j
n(C); P
j
n(C)); (3)

j
(C) 
nX
i=1
nX
h=1
iejih(C)[i(Cjh) Djh(C)]; (4)
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with

j
h(C) = 
j
h(e(C)) for all h if nX
i=1
nX
k=1
iejik(C) > 0;
P
j
h(C) = P
j
h(C
j
h; e(C)) for all h if nX
i=1
iejih(C) > 0;

j
h(C)  0 and P
j
h(C) 2 [1(Cjh);n(Cjh)] for all h; with
nX
h=1

j
h(C) = 1;
if
nX
i=1
nX
k=1
iejik(C) = 0:
The notations in Denition 1 are as follows. Consider a prole of contracts C =
(C1; :::; Cm) where Cj = (Cj1 ; C
j
2 ; :::; C
j
n; D
j(:)) is the menu o¤ered by insurer j. Then

j
h(C) is the proportion of insurer j
0s policyholders who choose Cjh when C is of-
fered, with P
j
h(C) the corresponding prot per policyholder. When insurer j at-
tracts policyholders, then 
j
h(C) and P
j
h(C) are derived from individuals contract
choice strategy e(C). Otherwise, jh(C) and P jh(C) are out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
fullll the coherency conditions stated in Denition 1. Then D
j
h(C) and 
j
(C) de-
ned by (3) and (4) denote the policy dividend for Cjh and the residual prot of
insurer j, respectively. They depend on the set of contracts C o¤ered in the mar-
ket and on the prole of individuals contract choice strategy e(:). In particular,
D
j
h(C) =
eDjh(j1(C); P j1(C); :::; jn(C); P jn(C)) if Cj = eCj.
Keeping these notations in mind, (1) and (2) correspond to the standard denition
of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. From (1), choosing Cjh with probability ejih(C)
is an optimal contract choice for type i individuals, given expected policy dividends.11
(2) means that eCj is an optimal o¤er by insurer j (i.e., an o¤er that maximizes residual
11Since there is a continuum of individuals in the population, when a type i individual chooses her
mixed strategy i(C), she considers that expected underwriting prot P
j
h(C) and expected policy
dividends D
j
h(C) are independent from her own choices. This is implicit in equation (1): type i
individuals choose their insurance contract for given expectations on policy dividends, because they
believe they are innitesimal in the group of insureds who choose the same contract. If Cjh is chosen
by nobody, or more generally if insurer j does not attract any customer, then individuals estimate
11
prot, that is, the di¤erence between underwriting prot and policy dividend) wheneC j is o¤ered by the other insurers, given the contract choice strategy of individuals.
Let C denote the menu of contracts at a symmetric equilibrium of the market game
(dened as an equilibrium where all active insurers, i.e., all insurers with customers,
o¤er the same menu and individuals are evenly shared between insurers), with eCj =
C  (C1 ; C2 ; :::; Cn; D(:)) for each active insurer j and Ci = (ki ; xi ) for all i = 1; :::; n
and D(:)  (D1(:); :::; Dn(:)). If individuals do not randomize between contracts,
Ci = (k

i ; x

i ) denotes the contract chosen by type i individuals.
A symmetric equilibrium of the market game sustains an equilibrium allocation
f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng, where (W 1i ;W 2i ) is the lottery on nal wealth induced by
the equilibrium strategies for type i individuals (meaning that their nal wealth isW 1i
with probability 1  i and W 2i with probability i), with W 1i = WN   ki +Di and
W 2i = WA + x

i +D

i ; where D

i  Di (1;1; :::; n;n) with i  i(Ci ):
Our main objective in what follows is to establish the existence and uniqueness
of such an equilibrium allocation. To do that, we rst characterize a candidate equi-
librium allocation by following the Spence (1978) approach to the Miyazaki-Wilson
equilibrium with an arbitrary number of types (we will call it the MWS allocation),
and next we show that this allocation is sustained by a prole of strategies which is a
symmetric equilibrium of the market game.
3.2 The MWS allocation
When a type i individual takes out a contract Ci = (ki; xi) and receives policy dividend
Di, then she is facing lottery (W 1i ;W
2
i ) = (WN ki+Di;WA+xi+Di), and the insurers
P
j
h(C) and D
j
h(C) by considering themselves as members of a deviant group with innitesimal mass
who would choose contracts o¤ered by insurer j, and their out-of-equilibrium beliefs correspond to
the composition of this hypothetical deviant group.
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expected residual prot (in short, its prot) is
i(Ci) Di = WN   (1  i)W 1i   i(W 2i + A): (5)
This allows us to characterize candidate equilibrium allocations as follows. Let us
dene a sequence of expected utility levels ui by u

1 = u(WN 1A), and for 2  i  n:
ui = max(1  i)u(W 1i ) + iu(W 2i )
with respect to W 1h ;W
2
h ; h = 1; :::; i , subject to
(1  h)u(W 1h ) + hu(W 2h )  uh for h < i; (6)
(1  h)u(W 1h ) + hu(W 2h )  (1  h)u(W 1h+1) + hu(W 2h+1) for h < i; (7)
iX
h=1
h[WN   (1  h)W 1h   h(W 2h + A)] = 0: (8)
Let Pi denote the problem which denes ui , with i = 2; :::; n. The objective function
in Pi is the expected utility of type i individuals by restricting attention to individuals
with types 1 to i. Constraints (6) ensure that higher risk individuals (i.e. h < i) get
expected utility no less than uh. (7) are incentive compatibility constraints: type h
individuals (with h < i) are deterred from choosing the policy targeted at the adjacent
less risky type h+1. (8) is the break-even constraint over the set of risk types h  i. For
n = 2, the optimal solution to P2 is the Miyazaki-Wilson equilibrium allocation. Let
f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng be the optimal solution to Pn. It is characterized in Lemmas 1
and 2, which are adapted from Spence (1978), and, as usual in the literature, we may
call it the MWS allocation.
Lemma 1 There exist T 2 N; 0T  n   1, and `t 2 f0; :::; ng, t = 0; :::; T + 1 with
`0 = 0  `1  `2 :::  `T < `T+1 = n such that for all t = 0; :::; T
hX
i=`t+1
i[WN   (1  i)cW 1i   i(cW 2i + A)] < 0 for all h = `t + 1; :::; `t+1   1; (9)
`t+1X
i=`t+1
i[WN   (1  i)cW 1i   i(cW 2i + A)] = 0: (10)
13
Furthermore, we have
(1  i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) = ui if i 2 f`1; `2; :::; ng; (11)
(1  i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) > ui otherwise: (12)
In Pn, for each risk type i lower than n, the optimal lottery (cW 1i ;cW 2i ) trades o¤ the
increase in insurance cost against the relaxation of the adjacent incentive constraint. In
addition, the minimal expected utility level ui has to be reached. Lemma 1 states that
this trade-o¤ results in pooling risk types in T + 1 subgroups indexed by t. Subgroup
t includes risk types i = `t + 1; :::; `t+1 with `0 = 0 and `T+1 = n. From (12), within
each subgroup t, all types i except the highest (i.e. i = `t + 1; :::; `t+1   1) get more
than their reservation utility ui , and from (9) there is negative prot over this subset
of individuals. They are cross-subsidized by the highest risk type (i.e., by type `t+1).
From (11) and (10), type `t just reaches its reservation utility u`t, for t = 1; :::; T + 1,
with zero prot over the whole subgroup t. In what follows, I will denote the set of
risk types in subgroups with cross-subsidization, i.e.
i 2 I  f1; :::; ng if `t < i  `t+1
for t 2 f0; :::; Tg such that `t+1   `t  2:
When n = 2, we know from Crocker and Snow (1985)12 that there exists  2 (0; 1)
such that I = f1; 2g if 1 <  and I = ; if 1  . When n > 2, the population
is distributed among subgroups. A case with n = 5; T = 2; `1 = 3 and `2 = 4 is
illustrated in Figure 1. There are three subgroups in this example: type i = 3 cross-
subsidizes types 1 and 2, while the contracts o¤ered to types 4 and 5 make zero prot.
We thus have I = f1; 2; 3g and buh > uh for h = 1; 2 and buh = uh for h = 3; 4 and 5,
where buh is the type h expected utility at the optimal solution to Pn.13
12See also Picard (2014).
13The structure of cross-subsidization subgroups follows from the interaction of the i and i in a
complex way, which makes a more precise characterization di¢ cult. For given i, intuition suggests
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Figure 1
Lemma 2 There does not exist any incentive compatible allocation f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i =
1; :::; ng such that
(1  `t)u(W 1`t) + `tu(W 2`t)  u`t for all t = 1; :::; T + 1 (13)
and
nX
i=1
i[WN   (1  i)W 1i   i(W 2i + A)] > 0: (14)
Lemma 2 states that no insurer can make positive prot by attracting all individuals
and o¤ering more than u`t to threshold types `t. Suppose that there exists a protable
allocation close to f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng that provides more than u`t to types `t.
Such an allocation would provide an expected utility larger than uh for all h (this
is just a consequence of the second part of Lemma 1), which would contradict the
denition of un. The proof of Lemma 2 extends this argument to allocations that are
not close to f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng. The main consequence of Lemma 2 is that it
is impossible to make positive prot in a deviation from f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng if
threshold types `t are guaranteed to get at least u`t .
3.3 Existence of an equilibrium
Proposition 1 f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng is an equilibrium allocation. It is sustained
by a symmetric equilibrium of the market game where each insurer j o¤ers Cj = C 
( bC1; :::; bCn; D(:)), type i individuals choose bCi  (bki; bxi) = (WN  cW 1i ;cW 2i  WA) and
that the case described in Figure 1 emerges from a situation where 1=3 and 2=3 are relatively
small so that cross-subsidizing risk types 1 and 2 allows a higher expected utility u3 for type 3 to be
reached, while 3=4 and 4=5 are relatively large so that it would be too costly to cross-subsidize
risk types 3 and 4.
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D(:) = (D1(:); :::; D

n(:)) is any policy dividend rule such thatX
i2I
NiD

i (N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn) 
X
i2I
NiPi; (15)
Di (1;1( bC1); :::; n;n( bCn)) = 0 for all i = 1; :::; n; (16)
D`t(N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn)  0 for all t = 1; :::; T + 1: (17)
At the symmetric equilibrium of the market game described in Proposition 1, each
insurer o¤ers C = ( bC1; :::; bCn; D(:)), and type i individuals choose bCi. The condi-
tions on D(:) are su¢ cient for C to be an equilibrium contract o¤er. (15) means
that prots are fully distributed among the individuals who choose a contract with
cross-subsidization at equilibrium, and from (16) no policy dividend is paid on the
equilibrium path. From (17), threshold types `t are excluded from the sharing of
prots.
To intuitively understand how Proposition 1 is deduced from Lemma 2, consider
an allocation induced by Cj0 6= C o¤ered by a deviant insurer j0. This corresponds
to a compound lottery generated by individualsmixed strategies over Cj0 and C.
The aggregate residual prot of this allocation is larger or equal to the prot made
on Cj0 alone, because non-deviant insurers j 6= j0 o¤er a menu of contracts with full
distribution of prots or payment of losses on f bCi; i 2 Ig and non-negative prots on
f bCi; i =2 Ig. Furthermore, Condition (17) assures that all threshold types `t get at least
u`t . Lemma 2 shows that this allocation cannot be protable, hence deviant insurer
j0 does not make positive prot14.
Remark 1 Note that equilibrium premiums are not uniquely dened, since insurers
may compensate higher premiums through higher dividends. More precisely, the equilib-
rium allocation f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng can also be sustained by an equilibrium of the
market game where insurers o¤er contracts bC 0i  (bk0i; bx0i) where bk0i = bki+ and bx0i = bxi 
14More precisely, Proposition 1 follows from a straightforward extension of Lemma 2 to allocations
with randomization between contracts. See Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
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, with policy dividend rule Di (N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn)  Di (N1; P1  ; :::; Nn; Pn  ) + ,
with  > 0. In that case, dividends include a xed part  paid to all policyholders and
a variable part that does not concern threshold types. Hence, the fundamental meaning
of Condition (17) is not the fact that threshold types do not receive policy dividends,
since they may actually receive such dividends according to the level of premiums: Con-
dition (17) assures us that threshold types cannot be penalized when deviant insurers
o¤er new contracts.15
Although no policy dividend (or dividend ) is paid on the equilibrium path, there
may be variations in policy dividends when a deviant insurer j0 o¤ers a menu Cj0 that
di¤ers from C = ( bC1; :::; bCn). Such a deviation may a¤ect the distribution of types
among individuals who still choose a contract in C, with possible variations in prots
or losses of insurers j 6= j0, and thus policy dividends or supplementary premiums.
Variations in policy dividends can then act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant
insurers from undertaking competitive attacks. For the sake of illustration, assume
Di (N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn) =
bki   bk`t+1
`t+1X
h=`t+1
Nh(bkh   bk`t+1)
`t+1X
h=`t+1
NhPh (18)
for all i 2 f`t + 1; :::; `t+1g  I. Here, D(:) involves the sharing of prot within
each subgroup t with cross-subsidization. The total prot made within subgroup t
is
P`t+1
h=`t+1
NhPh. It is distributed to policyholders within the same subgroup. Fur-
thermore, according to the policy dividend rule, the larger the premium, the larger
15Condition (17) seems necessary to get an equilibrium existence result when n > 2. For the sake
of illustration, assume n = 3 and consider a case where bC1 is in decit and bC2 and bC3 are protable
when respectively chosen by types 1; 2 and 3 (a case where I = f1; 2; 3g and T = 0). Assume also
that underwriting prot or losses are uniformly shared between policyholders, including type 3. In
that case, if 2 is small enough, there exists a protable non-participating contract C 02 closed to bC2
which would attract type 2 individuals if o¤ered in deviation from equilibrium, while types 1 and 3
would keep choosing bC1 and bC3 and pay (small) supplementary premiums.
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the policy dividend in absolute value. There is no right to receive a policy dividend
for the individuals who pay the smallest premium (i.e. for type `t+1), while rights
are larger for types i who pay larger premiums, which reects the practice of mutu-
als that pay larger dividends to policyholders who have paid larger premiums. We
have
P`t+1
h=`t+1
h( bCh) = 0 for all t from (10), and thus this policy dividend rule
satises conditions (15)-(17). If a deviant insurer j0 attracts some individuals who
cross-subsidize other risk types within subgroup t, then after the deviation we will
have
P`t+1
h=`t+1
NhPh < 0 for non-deviant insurers j 6= j0, and consequently the welfare
of these other individuals will deteriorate if they keep choosing the same contract be-
cause they will have to pay supplementary premiums. It may then be impossible for
insurer j0 to not also attract them, which will make its o¤er non-protable. The proof
of Proposition 1 shows that this is indeed the case.16
16It might be objected that, in practice, a deviant insurer could limit its o¤er to a small number of
individuals by rationing demand, which would lessen the e¤ect of its action on non-deviant insurers.
In this way, if a deviant insurer restricts its o¤er to a small group of size ", then its deviation
only entails a small e¤ect on the prot of non-deviant insurers: the lower ", the smaller the shift
in the lotteries o¤ered by non-deviant insurers, which would open the door to protable deviations
attracting type `t individuals when I 6= ;. A complete analysis of the market equilibrium with
quantity rationing is beyond the scope of the present paper and would require a thorough analysis.
However, at this stage, we may observe that insurers could use discontinuous policy dividend rules
to prevent deviant competitors from attracting a small group of their policyholders. For example,
participating contracts may stipulate that no policy dividend will be distributed unless the insurers
prot reaches a predetermined target level. Equilibrium strategies may consist of o¤ering bC 0i  (bk0i; bx0i),
as dened in Remark 1 if i 2 I, and committing to pay positive dividend  if the prot is at least 
and nothing otherwise. Any deviation that attracts " type `t individuals would cancel the payment of
policy dividends by non-deviant insurers. Consequently, there exists a continuation equilibrium where
the deviant does not make prot. Regarding competition with quantity rationing in the insurance
market, see Inderst and Wambach (2001).
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More generally, we may choose D(:) such that
`t+1X
i=`t+1
i2I
NiD

i (N1; P1; :::; Nn; Pn) 
`t+1X
i=`t+1
i2I
NiPi;
for all subgroup t with cross-subsidization, which shows that the equilibrium allocation
is also sustained by equilibrium strategies where each insurer sells insurance to a given
subgroup of individuals (gathering risk types i = `t+1; :::; `t+1 in I) or to a combination
of these subgroups. Insurers who sell insurance to subgroups with only one risk type
(i.e. to types i =2 I) or to a combination of these subgroups do not cross-subsidize risks.
They o¤er non-participating policies, and we may consider them as stock insurers.
Insurers who sell insurance policies to individuals who belong to subgroups with cross-
subsidization (i.e. to types i 2 I) o¤er fully participating policies: they act as mutuals
do. In the example illustrated in Figure 1, mutuals would o¤er participating contracts
to subgroup t = 1 (that includes types 1, 2 and 3) and stock insurers would o¤er
non-participating contracts to subgroups t = 2 and 3: Hence, the model explains why
stock insurers and mutuals may coexist: mutuals o¤er insurance contracts that are
robust to competitive attacks when there is cross-subsidization, while stock insurers
o¤er insurance contracts at actuarial price. The following corollary recaps our results
more compactly.
Corollary 1 The MWS allocation is also sustained by a market equilibrium where
mutual insurers o¤er participating contracts to subgroups of individuals with types i 2 I
and stock insurers o¤er non-participating contracts to types i =2 I.
3.4 Uniqueness of equilibrium
Participating contracts induce an interdependence between the individualscontract
choices. Consequently: multiple continuation equilibria17 may exist after menus of
17Contract choice strategies e(C) = ( e1(C); e2(C); :::; en(C)) dene a continuation equilibrium
associated with the contract o¤er C when they satisfy (1), with D
j
h(C) given by (3).
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contracts have been o¤ered at stage 1. Typically, type i individuals may decide to
choose a participating contract o¤ered by insurer j if they anticipate that less risky
types i0 (i.e., i0 > i) are going to do the same, but they may make another choice
for other expectations. This creates leeway in the characterization of a continuation
equilibrium after a deviation at stage 1, and it opens the door to multiple equilibrium
issues in the market game itself. In particular, contracts may not be chosen by anyone
because of pessimistic expectations about the contracts o¤ered by inactive insurers:
insurance seekers may anticipate that the insurers who o¤er these contracts are go-
ing to attract only high-risk individuals, with negative underwriting prot. These
pessimistic expectations (i.e., out-of-equilibrium beliefs) may annihilate protable de-
viations, although such deviations would exist under more optimistic expectations.
An equilibrium sustained by arbitrarily pessimistic beliefs is not very convincing if
choosing contracts o¤ered by a deviant insurer were benecial to some policyholders.
Denition 2 introduces a robustness criterion, that eliminates such equilibria.
Denition 2 A market equilibrium e(:); eC is based on robust beliefs if there does not
exist a deviation Cj0 where insurer j0 does not attract any customer, i.e.,Xn
i=1
Xn
h=1
iej0ih(Cj0 ; eC j0) = 0;
and a risk type i0 such that:
(i) Type i0 individuals would be better o¤ if they choose a contract C
j0
i0
in Cj0 in
a deviation from their equilibrium strategy, and if they belong to an innitely small
subset of type i0 individuals who are the only ones to do so, i.e.,
Ui0(C
j0
i0
; D
j0
i0
) > maxfUi0( eCjh; Djh(C)); j 6= j0; h = 1; :::; ng;
where D
j0
i0
is the policy dividend received by type i0 individuals when they are the only
ones to choose a contract in Cj0,18
18Since Dj0h (N
j0
1 ; P
j0
1 ; :::; N
j0
n ; P
j0
n ) is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to (N
j0
1 ; :::; N
j0
n ),
D
j0
i0 does not depend on the mass of the subset ot type i0 individual who choose C
j0
i0
.
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(ii) insurer j0 attracts type i0 policyholders, and possibly other individuals, in at
least one other continuation equilibrium following the deviation from eCj0 to Cj0 and
makes positive prot at all such continuation equilibria.
A robust equilibrium allocation is sustained by a symmetric market equilibrium
based on robut beliefs.
Proposition 2 The MSW allocation is the only robust equilibrium allocation.
Presumably, individuals may make error in the real world, and this is the logic of
the robustness criterion used to eliminate equilibria based on arbitrarily pessimistic
beliefs. In Denition 2  (i), if a subgroup of type i0 individuals with positive measure
do such an error (i.e., they choose Cj0i0 ), then they would observe that this departure
from their equilibrium contracts is in fact favorable to them. Denition 2 (ii) adds
the condition that this improvement would be conrmed at all continuation equilibria
where insurer j0 attracts policyholders, and that such continuation equilibria exist and
are protable to insurer j0. Denition 2 says that an equilibrium is based on robust
beliefs if such deviations do not exist and Proposition 2 states that the MWS allocation
is the only equilibrium allocation when beliefs are required to be robust.
Remark 2 Denition 2 is inspired by robustness criterions in games with a continuum
of players (non-atomic games). In an evolutionary game setting with a large group of
identical players, a (mixed or pure) strategy of a given player is said to be neutrally
stable (NSS) if there does not exist another strategy that would be strongly prefered by
this player if this alternative strategy were played by a small enough fraction of similar
individuals19. Denition 2 (i) adapts the NSS criterion to any subgame that follows
19The NSS criterion was introduced by Maynard Smith (1982). In the terminology of evolutionary
games, the alternative strategy is played by a small group of "mutants" who appears in a large
population of individuals who are programmed to play the same incumbent strategy. Following the
biological intuition, we may assume that evolutionary forces select against the mutant strategy if and
only if its postentry payo¤ (or tness) is not larger than that of the incumbent strategy. Thus, a
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a deviation by some insurer j0. Denition 2  (ii) weakens this equilibrium selection
criterion by requiring that alternative strategies also provide a higher expected utility
to the deviant individuals at another equilibrium (thus, not only when they are played
in deviation from equilibrium by a small subgroup of individuals) and that insurer j0
makes positive prot in such continuation equilibria.
4 Concluding comments
Thus, the MWS allocation is always an equilibrium allocation in the Rothschild-Stiglitz
model when insurers can issue participating or non-participating policies. It is the
only equilibrium allocation when out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy a robustness cri-
terion. This equilibrium allocation is characterized by a classication of individuals
into subgroups as done by Spence (1978), with cross-subsidization within each sub-
group that includes several risk types. Participating policies act as an implicit threat
which prevents deviant insurers from attracting low-risk individuals only. If a de-
viant insurer attracts individuals who cross-subsidize other risk types within a given
subgroup, then these other individuals will have to pay supplementary premiums or
receive lower dividends if they keep choosing the same contract from their non-deviant
insurer. Consequently, it will be impossible for the deviant insurer to not also attract
them, which will make its o¤er non-protable.
This mechanism is similar to the logic of the MWS equilibrium. In both cases, a de-
viant insurer is deterred from attracting low risk individuals because it is expected that
ultimately its o¤er would also attract higher risks, which would make it unprotable.
However, in the MWS equilibrium, insurers are protected from these competitive at-
neutrally stable strategy cannot be destabilized by deviations of a small group of mutants. NSS is
a weakening of the evolutionary stability criterion (ESS) introduced by Maynard Smith and Price
(1973) and Maynard Smith (1974). On the connections between evolutionary stability criteria and
other robustness criteria of Nash equilibria, see Weibull (1995).
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tacks because they can react by withdrawing contracts that become unprotable. This
assumption may be considered as unsatisfactory because it means that insurers are not
committed to actually o¤er the announced contracts. It can also be legitimately argued
that this description of the dynamic relationship between insurers is arbitrary. Other
timings are possible, as shown by Riley (1979), Hellwig (1987) and others. Mimra and
Wambach (2014) list papers that have departed from the original game structure of
Rosthschild and Stiglitz (1976), and we have to admit that no particular timing has an
obvious superiority over the others. Moving away from the Rothschild-Stiglitz game
structure may be like opening a Pandoras box, since there always exist new ways to
describe the dynamic competitive interaction between rms.
We have taken a di¤erent route. Our analysis has not stepped away from the in-
stantaneous strategic interaction between insurers that characterizes the Rothschild-
Stiglitz model, and we have explored the consequences of deleting an exogenous re-
striction on the content of insurance policies.20 As observed by Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) themselves, extending their model in order to include "the peculiar provision
of many insurance contracts", rstly by considering menus, and secondly by allowing
insurers to pay policy dividends, is a natural way to reconcile the empirical observation
and the theoretical denition of a market equilibrium, and this is what we have done
in this paper. Of course, we may consider that the glass is half empty rather than
half full, and that even more general contracts, e.g., with quantity rationing, should
be considered. This is another research avenue worth exploring. However, the case
where rms commit to honour the o¤ers made to clients, without restricting these
o¤ers to a subset of consumers, seems to be a natural starting point for the analysis
20To be honest, it must be acknowledged that there are two possible game theory interpretation
of the Rothschild-Stiglitz framework. In the most usual one, insurers face a continuum of individuals
of various possible risk types, and they know the fraction of each type, but not any given individuals
type. This is the interpretation we have come up with in this paper. In another one, insurers compete
for a single potential insured individual whose type is privately observed, and insurers have a common
prior over this type. Only the rst interpretation is compatible with our analysis.
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of competitive markets.
The main outcome of this modelling, apart from the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium, is the fact that it leads to an endogenous denition of corporate forms,
where mutuals and stock insurers may coexist, with specic functions: mutuals may
provide coverage to risk groups that require cross-subsidization, while at the same
time being protected against competitive attacks that would target their least risky
policyholders. Subgroups without cross-subsidization do not require such endogenous
protection, and they purchase non-participating or participating contracts. If, for
some other reasons, stock insurers benet from competitive advantages, for instance
because they can transfer systemic risks to stockholders, then we may reach a complete
market structuring that trades o¤ the ability of mutuals to implement e¢ cient cross-
subsidization and the superiority of stock insurers in the face of macroeconomic risks.
The diversity of market structures that we may observe in practice suggests that the
balance is not always on the same side.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
If
Pi
h=1 h[WN   (1 h)cW 1h  h(cW 2h +A)] > 0 for i 2 f1; :::; ng, then it would be
possible to provide a higher expected utility than uh for all h = 1; :::; i, while breaking
even over the subset of individuals h = 1; :::; i, which would contradict the denition of
ui .
21 We thus have
Pi
h=1 h[WN   (1 h)cW 1h  h(cW 2h +A)]  0 for all i 2 f1; :::; ng,
which yields the rst part of the Lemma.
We have (1   i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i )  ui for all i from the denition of Pn. If
i 2 f`1; `2; :::; ng, we have
Pi
h=1 h[WN   (1   h)cW 1h   h(cW 2h + A)] = 0 from the
rst part of the Lemma, and we deduce (1  i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) = ui , for otherwise
21More explicitly, let " be a positive real number and let f(W 1h ();W 2h ()); h = 1; :::; ig that saties
(7) for all  > 0 with W 1h (0) = cW 1h ;W 2h (0) = cW 2h for all h = 1; :::; i; and dW 1h=d = dW 2h=d > " for
all  and all h = 1; :::i. There exists b > 0 such that f(W 1h (b);W 2h (b)); h = 1; :::; ig saties (8), with
Ui(W
1
h (b);W 2h (b)) > uh for all h = 1; :::; i, which contradicts the denition of ui .
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we would have a contradiction with the denition of ui . Conversely, suppose we
have (1   i)u(cW 1i ) + iu(cW 2i ) = ui and i =2 f`1; `2; :::; ng. We would then havePi
h=1 h[WN   (1  h)cW 1h   h(cW 2h +A)] < 0. Hence the allocation f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h =
1; :::; ig is in decit. Let f(W 10h ;W 20h ); h = 1; :::; ig be the optimal solution to Pi.
Replacing f(cW 1h ;cW 2h ); h = 1; :::; ig with f(W 10h ;W 20h ); h = 1; :::; ig allows us to improve
the optimal solution to Pn, since the same type i expected utility ui can be reached
while breaking even on the set h = 1; :::; i, which provides additional resources that
could be used to raise (1  n)u(W 1n) + nu(W 2n) over (1  n)u(cW 1n) + nu(cW 2n). We
thus obtain a contradiction with the fact that f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng is the optimal
solution to Pn.
Proof of Lemma 2
Werst restrict attention to incentive compatible allocations f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng
located in a neighbourhood of f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng. Suppose that such an alloca-
tion satises (13)-(14). Lemma 1 shows that
(1  i)u(W 1i ) + iu(W 2i )  ui for all i = 1; :::; n;
if (W 1i ;W
2
i ) is close enough to (cW 1i ;cW 2i ). Hence f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng satises the
constraints of Pn with positive prots and expected utility larger or equal to un for
type n, hence a contradiction.
We now prove that there does not exist any incentive compatible allocation f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i =
1; :::; ng that satises (13)-(14), even if we do not restrict attention to allocations close
to f(cW 1i ;cW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng. Let us dene zsi  u(W si ) and bzsi  u(cW si ) for i = 1; :::; n
and s = 1; 2. With this change of variable, the Lemma states that there does not exist
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f(z1i ; z2i ); i = 1; :::; ng such that
(1  `t)z1`t + `tz2`t  u`t for all t = 1; :::; T + 1 ; (19)
(1  i)z1i + iz2i  (1  i)z1i+1 + iz2i+1 for i = 1; :::; n  1 ; (20)
nX
i=1
if(1  i)[WN   u 1(z1i )]  i[u 1(z2i ) WA]g
>
nX
i=1
if(1  i)[WN   u 1(bz1i )]  i[u 1(bz2i ) WA]g: (21)
The set of f(z1i ; z2i ); i = 1; :::; ng that satises the conditions (19)-(21) is convex.
Hence if there is any allocation f(z1i ; z2i ); i = 1; :::; ng that satises these conditions,
there is an allocation in any neighbourhood of f(bz1i ; bz2i ); i = 1; :::; ng that satises them,
which contradicts our previous result.
Remark 3 Lemmas 1 and 2 easily extend to allocations where individuals of a given
type may randomize between contracts that are equivalent for themselves. An allocation
is then a type-dependent randomization over a set of lotteries. Formally, an alloca-
tion is dened by a set of lotteries f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s = 1; :::; Sg and individuals choices
  (1; 2; :::; n) with i = (i1; :::; iS), where is is the probability that a type i
individual chooses (W 1s ;W
2
s ), with
PS
s=1 is = 1. In other words, type i individuals
get a compound lottery generated by their mixed strategy i over available lotteries
f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s = 1; :::; Sg. An allocation is incentive compatible if
SX
s=1
is[(1  i)u(W 1s ) + iu(W 2s )] = maxf(1  i)u(W 1s ) + iu(W 2s ); s = 1; :::; Sg;
for all i = 1; :::; n. In words, an allocation is incentive compatible when individuals
only choose their best contract with positive probability. The denition of Problem Pi
for i = 1; :::; n can be extended straightforwardly to this more general setting, with an
unchanged denition of ui . In particular, individuals choose only one (non compound)
lottery at the optimal solution to Pi, and the MWS lotteries are still an optimal solution
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to Pn. Lemma 1 is thus still valid. Lemma 3 extends Lemma 2 to the case where
individuals may randomize between contracts.
Lemma 3 There does not exist any incentive compatible allocation with randomization
f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s = 1; :::; S;  (1; 2; :::; n)g such that
SX
s=1
`t;s[(1  `t)u(W 1s ) + `tu(W 2s )]  u`t for all t = 1; :::; T + 1 (22)
and
nX
h=1
hf
SX
s=1
hs[WN   (1  h)W 1s   h(W 2s + A)]g > 0: (23)
Proof of Lemma 3
For a given incentive compatible allocation with randomization f(W 1s ;W 2s ); s =
1; :::; S;  (1; 2; :::; n)g, let (W 1h;W
2
h) = (W
1
s(h);W
2
s(h)) be one of the the most
protable lotteries which are chosen by type h individuals with positive probability,
i.e., s(h) is such that h;s(h) > 0 and
(1  h)W 1s(h) + hW 2s(h)  (1  h)W 1s0 + hW 2s0
for all s0 such that h;s0 > 0. If (22) and (23) hold for the initial allocation with ran-
domization, then (13) and (14) also hold for the non-randomized incentive compatible
allocation f(W 1h;W
2
h); h = 1; :::; ng, which contradicts Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 For any contract o¤er C = (C1; :::; Cm) made at stage 1, there exists at
least one continuation equilibrium (C) = ( 1(C); 2(C); :::; n(C)) at stage 2.
Proof of Lemma 4
Let C = (C1; :::; Cm) with Cj = (Cj1 ; :::; C
j
n; D
j(:)) be a contract o¤er. Consider a
discretization of the stage 2 subgame that follows C, with N individuals. Individuals
are indexed by t = 1; :::; N and SNi is the set of type i individuals, with
XN
i=1
SNi  =
N . In this discretized game, a pure strategy of individual t is the choice of a contract in
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C. Let us denote sjth = 1 if individual t chooses C
j
h and s
j
th = 0 otherwise. The expected
utility of a type i who chooses Cjh is Ui(C
j
h; X
j
h), whereX
j
h = D
j
h(
j
1; P
j
1 ; :::; 
j
n; P
j
n), with
jh =
PN
t=1 s
j
thPN
t=1
Pn
k=1 s
j
tk
if
NX
t=1
nX
k=1
sjtk > 0;
P jh =
Pn
i=1
P
t2SNi s
j
thi(C
j
h)PN
t=1 s
j
th
if
NX
t=1
sjth > 0;
This discretized subgame is a nite strategic-form game. Consider an " perturbation
of this game, with " > 0, where all individuals may play mixed strategy and are
required to choose each contract Cjh with probability larger or equal to ". This pertur-
bated game is characterized by N and " and it has a mixed strategy equilibrium, where
all type i individuals choose Cjh with probability 
jN
ih (")  ".22 Let Ni (") = (jNih (")).
Thus, if t 2 SNi , we have
E
h
Ui(C
j
h; X
jN
ht (")
N(")i = maxnE hUi(Cjk; XjNkt (") N(")i for all j; ko
if jNih (") > "; (24)
where expected value E

:
N(") is conditional on the equilibrium mixed strategies
played by all individuals except t, and where XjNht (") is the equilibrium random policy
dividend when all individuals except t play the equilibrium type-dependent mixed
strategy N(") = (N1 ("); :::; 
N
n (")) and individual t chooses C
j
h.
Consider a sequence of such discretized subgames indexed by N 2 N, where "
depends on N , with "  "N > 0, such that SNi  =N ! i for all i and "N ! 0 when
N !1. The sequence fN = (:::; jNi ("N); :::)gN2N is in a compact set, and thus it
includes a converging subsequence: N !  = (:::; jih; :::) with
Pm
j=1
Pn
h=1 
j
ih = 1
for all i, when N !1; N 2 N0  N. Let jNk ; P jNk be the equilibrium proportion of
insurer js policyholders who choose Cjk and the corresponding equilibrium prot per
22The payo¤ functions are such that there is always an equilibrium of the discretized game where
individuals of the same type play the same mixed strategy.
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policyholder, respectively. The weak law of large numbers yields
jNh
P!
nX
i=1
i
jN
ih ("
N)
nX
i=1
nX
k=1
i
jN
ik ("
N)
 jNh ;
P jNh
P!
nX
i=1
i
jN
ih ("
N)i(C
j
h)
nX
i=1
i
jN
ih ("
N)
 P jNh ;
when N !1. We have

jN
h !
nX
i=1
i
j
ih
nX
i=1
nX
k=1
i
j
ik
 jh if
nX
i=1
nX
k=1
i
j
ik > 0;
P jNh !
nX
i=1
i
j
ihi(C
j
h)
nX
i=1
i
j
ih
 P jh if
nX
i=1
i
j
ih > 0;
when N ! 1; N 2 N0. If Pni=1Pnk=1 ijik = 0, then we have jNh ! jh  0
and P jNh ! P
j
h , with
Pn
h=1 
j
h = 1 and P
j
h 2 [1(Cjh);n(Cjh)] for all h, when
N !1; N 2 N0.
We have
XjNht ("N) Djh(jN1 ; P jN1 ; :::; jNn ; P jNn )  ! 0 for all t when N  !
1. Hence, XjNht ("N) P! D
j
h  Djh(
j
1 ; P
j
1 ; :::; 
j
n ; P
j
n ) for all t whenN !1; N 2 N0.
Taking the limit of (24), when N !1 ; N 2 N0, then gives
Ui(C
j
h; D
j
h ) = maxfUi(Cjk; D
j
k ) for all j; kg if jih > 0:
Using
Pm
j=1
Pn
h=1 
j
ih = 1 then yields
mX
j=1
nX
h=1
jihUi(C
j
h; D
j
h ) = maxfUi(Cjh; D
j
h ) for all j; hg,
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which shows that  is an equilibrium of the stage 2 subgame when insurers o¤er C
at stage 1 and policy dividends are D
j
h .
Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that each insurer o¤ers bC = ( bC1; bC2; :::; bCn; D(:)) such that (15)-(17) hold.
Then bCi is an optimal choice of type i individuals if no policy dividend is paid on any
contract. (16) shows that this is actually the case when all individuals are evenly
shared among insurers.
Suppose some insurer j0 deviates from bC to another menu Cj0 = fCj01 ; Cj02 ; :::; Cj0n ;
Dj0(:)g with Cj0i = (kj0i ; xj0i ). Let e(Cj0 ; bC j0) be a continuation equilibrium following
the deviation, i.e., equilibrium contract choices by individuals in the subgame where
Cj0 and bC are simultaneously o¤ered, respectively by insurer j0 and by all the other
insurers j 6= j0. Lemma 4 shows that such a continuation equilibrium exists. Let us
restrict the denition of this subgame by imposing eji 1;i = 0 for all i =2 I; j 6= j0.
From (17), type i   1 individuals weakly prefer bCi 1 to bCi if i =2 I, so that any
equilibrium of the restricted game is also an equilibrium of the original game. Let
P
j
h be the prot per policyholder made by insurer j 6= j0 on contract bCh and jh be
the proportion of insurer j0 s customers who choose bCh, after the deviation by insurer
j0. Consider a continuation equilibrium where individuals of a given type are evenly
shared between insurers j 6= j0, i.e., where ejih(Cj0 ; bC j0) = ej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0) for all h if
j 6= j0, j; j0 6= j0 23. We may then use more compact notations e0ih  ej0ih(Cj0 ; bC j0)
and e1ih  ejih(Cj0 ; bC j0); P 1h = P jh; N1h = N jh for all j 6= j0. Let also P 0h and 0h be,
respectively, the average prot made on Cj0h and the proportion of the customers of
insurer j0 who choose C
j0
h .
After the deviation by insurer j0, type i individuals get the following lottery on
23Such a continuation equilibrium exists because it is a Nash equilibrium of an equivalent game
with only two insurers that respectively o¤er bC j0and Cj0 . Note that this equivalence is possible
because Djh(:) is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to (N
j
1 ; :::; N
j
n).
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nal wealth:
(W 10h;W
2
0h)  (WN   kj0h +D
0
h;WA + x
j0
h +D
0
h) with probability e0ih;
(W 11h;W
2
1h)  (cW 1h +D1h;cW 2h +D1h) with probability e1ih(n  1);
where
D
0
h = D
j0
h (
0
1; P
0
1; :::; 
0
n; P
0
n);
D
1
h = D

h(
1
1; P
1
1; :::; 
1
n; P
1
n);
for h = 1; :::; n, with
Pn
h=1[e0ih + e1ih(n  1)] = 1. Let us denote this lottery by L. Let
 denote the residual prot made by insurer j0. We have
 =
nX
i=1
if
nX
h=1
e0ih[WN   (1  i)W 10h   i(W 20h + A)]g: (25)
We know from (15) that D(:) involves the full distribution of prots made by non-
deviant insurers on the set of contracts f bCi; i 2 Ig. Furthermore, we have e1hi = 0 if
h < i   1 when i =2 I, because types h strongly prefer bCi 1 to bCi for all h < i   1.24
Thus we have e1hi = 0 if h  i when i =2 I, and consequently the prot made on bCi by
non-deviant insurers is non-negative when i =2 I. We deduce that non-deviant insurers
j make non-negative residual prot. We thus have
nX
i=1
if
nX
h=1
e1ih[WN   (1  i)W 11h   i(W 21h + A)]g  0: (26)
(25) and (26) then yield
 
nX
i=1
if
nX
h=1
e0ih[WN   (1  i)W 10h   i(W 20h + A)]
+(n  1)
nX
h=1
e1ih[WN   (1  i)W 11h   i(W 21h + A)]g: (27)
24Note that we here use Di  0 and Di 1  0 when i =2 I, which follows from (17).
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Furthermore, we have
nX
h=1
e0`t;h[(1  `t)u(W 10h) + `u(W 20h)]
+(n  1)
nX
h=1
e1`t;h[(1  `t)u(W 11h) + `tu(W 21h)
 u`t for all t = 1; :::; T + 1 (28)
because (W 11`t ;W
2
1`t
) = (cW 11`t ;cW 21`t) since D1`t = 0 from (17), and (1   `t)u(cW 11`t) +
`tu(cW 21`t) = u`t ; and fe0`t;h; e1`t;h; h = 1; :::; ng is an optimal contract choice strategy
of type `t individuals. The right-hand side of (27) is the expected prot associated
with L. Lemma 3 applied to lottery L then gives   0. Hence the deviation is
non-protable, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
In the proof of Proposition 1, it has been shown that the MWS allocation is sus-
tained by a market equilibrium where stage 1 deviations are non-protable at all
continuation equilibrium. Hence this equilibrium allocation is robust.
Let f(fW 1i ;fW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng be an equilibrium allocation that di¤ers from the
MWS allocation, with expected utility eui for type i. This allocation satises incentive
compatibility constraints (7) for all h = 1; :::; n 1, and it is sustained by a symmetric
Nash equilibrium of the market game with ma active insurers (ma  m) where each
active insurer o¤ers eC = ( eC1; eC2; :::; eCn; eD(:)), with eD(:) = ( eD1(:); eD2(:); :::; eDn(:)).
At such an equilibrium, insurers make non-negative residual prot, for otherwise they
would deviate to a "zero contract". Hence f(fW 1i ;fW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng satises (8) for
i = n, rewritten as a weak inequality (with sign ). Since f(fW 1i ;fW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng
satises (7) and (8) for i = n and it is not an optimal solution to Pn, we deduce
that there is i0 in f1; :::; ng such that eui  ui if i < i0 and eui0 < ui0 . Thus, there
exists an allocation f(W 1i ;W 2i ); i = 1; :::; i0g in the neighbourhood of the optimal
solution to Pi0 , with expected utility ui for type i, that satises (6) and (7) as strong
inequalities and (8) rewritten as a strong inequality (with sign <) for i = i0. Let
32
ki = WN  W 1i and xi = W 2i  WA for i  i0. Let j0 be some insurer that belongs to
the set of inactive insurers if ma = 1 and that may be active or inactive if ma > 1.
Suppose insurer j0 deviates from eC to Cj0 = fCj01 ; Cj02 ; :::; Cj0n ; Dj0(:)g with Dj0(:) =
(Dj01 (:); D
j0
2 (:); :::; D
j0
n (:)); where C
j0
i = (ki; xi) if i  i0; Cj0i = (0; 0) if i > i0 and
Dj0i (N
j0
1 ; P
j0
1 ; :::; N
j0
n ; P
j0
n ) =

0 if
Pi0
h=1N
j0
h P
j0
h > 0
 K if Pi0h=1N j0h P j0h  0 if i  i0;
Dj0i (N
j0
1 ; P
j0
1 ; :::; N
j0
n ; P
j0
n )  0 if i > i0;
with K > 0. For K large enough, insurer j0 makes positive prot at any continuation
equilibrium after the deviation to Cj0 where it attracts some individuals. This is
the case when all type i0 individuals choose C
j0
i0
and reach expected utility ui0 (with
ui0  ui0 > eui0) and possibly other individuals choose a contract in Cj0 . Thus, any
market equilibrium where insurer j0 does not attract some individuals after deviating
from eC to Cj0 is not based on robust beliefs. We deduce that f(fW 1i ;fW 2i ); i = 1; :::; ng
is not a robust equilibrium allocation.
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